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NOTE
THE RIGHT OF HANDICAPPED CHILDREN TO AN
EDUCATION: THE PHOENIX OF RODRIGUEZ
There are six million "handicapped" children in the United
States.' They suffer from an assortment of disabilities including
I Wall St. J., March 22, 1972, at 1, col. 1 (eastern ed.). Precise definitions of "handicap-
ped" are somewhat elusive. Compare the following legislative attempts.
A "handicapped child" is one who, because of niental, physical or emotional
reasons, cannot be educated in regular classes but can benefit by special services and
programs to include, but not limited to, transportation, the payment of tuition to
boards of cooperative educational services and public school districts, home teach-
ing, special classes, special teachers, and resource rooms.
N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 4401(1) (McKinney 1970).
The term "handicapped children" means mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf,
speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, crippled, or
other health impaired children who by reason thereof require special education and
related services.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (Supp. 1973). Prevalence data tend to vary widely from one study to
another, and these differences may be attributed to variations in definition, identification
criteria, and methodology. Frohreich, Costing Program for Exceptional Children: Dinensions and
Indices, 39 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 517, 521 (1972). One estimate follows:
Estimates of the Prevalence of Various Types of Exceptionality
in the United States
Estimates of Prevalence (percentages)
Category of exceptionality At  B C D
Gifted NE 2  NE 2.70 2.00
Educable mentally retarded 1.30 1.28 1.10 1.30
Trainable mentally retarded 0.187 0.18 0.24 0.24
Auditorily handicapped 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.10
Visually handicapped 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05
Speech handicapped 1.98 2.40 3.60 3.60
Physically handicapped 0.028 0.028 0.21 0.21
Neurological and special
learning disorders NE 0.026 1.12 1.12
Emotionally disturbed 0.50 0.50 0.58 2.00
Multiply handicapped 0.07 0.029 0.029 0.07
TOTAL 4.215 4.103 9.729 10.69
1 Column heads A, B, C, and D mean the following:
A: Estimates developed from information contained in "Statewide Summary of An-
nual Reports on Handicapped Minors Not Participating in Special Education
Programs," California State Department of Education, 1968. (Mimeo.)
B: Estimates developed from information contained in "1969-70 Summary of Special
Education Services of Bureau for Special Education," Division for Handicapped
Children, Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, 1970 (Mimeo.)
C: Estimates based on data regarding pupils enrolled and pupils eli gble but not being
served in the school districts whch comprised the sample in ths study.
D: Estimates used as a basis for population and cost projections in this study.
2 NE means no estimate was made.
Id. at 522.
A term which is closely related to the term handicapped child is the term exceptional
child. A child is considered exceptional only when it is necessary to alter the educational
program to meet his needs. S. KIRK, EDUCATING EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 5 (2d ed. 1972).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
physical incapacities, mental retardation, and mental and emotional
disorders. Because of their handicaps they are frequently unable to
benefit from the regular public school curriculum, and their be-
havior patterns may distract their fellow students.
These exceptional children need a variety of special educa-
tional services. 2 Yet less than one-half of them are receiving special
education,3 and over one million handicapped children are totally
excluded from a system of free public education. 4 The failure of
the public schools to provide an adequate education to exceptional
children most seriously affects the poor. Not only are the poor
unable to finance private schooling, but the incidence of handicaps
among children of low income families is appreciably higher than
the rate among children of middle and upper income families. 5
' Deno, Special Education as Developmental Capital, 37 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 229, 235
(1970).
' Martin, Individualism and Behaviorism as Future Trends in Educating Handicapped Chil-
dren, 38 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 517, 523 (1972).
' Wall St. J., March 22, 1972, at 1, col. 1 (eastern ed.); see TASK FORCE ON CHILDREN
OUT OF SCHOOL, THE WAY WE Go TO SCHOOL: THE EXCLUSION OF CHILDREN IN BOSTON
(1970) (documenting variety of exclusionary practices). Exclusion often occurs in urban
areas because of the shortage of space in special education classes or because of delays in
testing and diagnosing pupils who have already been identified by their teachers as not
functioning well in regular classrooms. While children are awaiting appropriate placement
they may be dismissed from the regular classroom if they are a behavior problem. Hearings
on Mentally Ill and Handicapped Children Before the House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Hearings].
Most children are effectively excluded because local communities have decided under
optional state laws not to provide special education. A 1962 study showed that only 16 states
had mandatory legislation regarding public school classes for educable mentally retarded
children, and 13 had such legislation for trainable mentally retarded. Roos, Trends and Issues
in Special Education for the Mentally Retarded, 5 EDUC. & TRAINING OF THE MENTALLY
RETARDED 51 (1970).
' The incidence of disability in disadvantaged homes has been estimated to be three
times that of other households. Remarks of Harrold Russell, Chairman of the President's
Committee on Employment of the Handicapped, Region VII Conference of the National
Rehabilitation Association, Oklahoma City, Okla., June 7-9, 1970. Malnutrition, lead poison-
ing, poor health care during pregnancy, poor health care for children, and inadequate
parental supervision leading to accidents are some of the reasons that the incidence of
handicaps is greater among the poor. See Young, Poverty, Intelligence and Life in the Inner City,
7 MENTAL RETARDATION 24, 24-25 (April 1969). See also. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON MENTAL
RETARDATION, THE DECISIVE DECADE 4 (1970) (malnutrition); PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON
MENTAL RETARDATION, THE EDGE OF CHANGE 19 (1968) (lack of prenatal care); PRESIDENT'S
COMM. ON MENTAL RETARDATION, ENTERING THE ERA OF HUMAN ECOLOGY 23 (1971) (lead
poisoning). The incidence of mental illness and emotional disturbances is also probably
higher among the poor. 1972 Hearings 67-69, 71. Moreover, the poor are much less likely to
receive proper treatment for their emotional disorders. Id. at 69-70.




The crux of the problem is cost. Educating handicapped
children is inevitably more expensive than educating other
children.6 Under the pressure of many competing priorities, public
school systems throughout the nation have responded in an uneven
and disappointing way to the needs of exceptional children.7
Prevalence of low IQ in white children
in relation to socioeconomic status
Percent of MR







S. KIRK, supra note 1, at 185.
6 The special education cost index is an empirical derivation, based on a formula which
accounts for the greater costs of programs for exceptional children. It is multiplied by the
regular per pupil expenditure to obtain the cost of educating a child in each category of
exceptionality. Such a formula is used by most governmental units and policy groups. 1972
Hearings 44.
As reported by one major study, the cost of special educational programs for a school
district having 20,000 pupils and a regular program expenditure of $850 per pupil has been
estimated as follows:
C E
A Special D Expendi-
Preva- program Special ture per Special
Category of lence B popu- program pupil in program
exceptional rate District lation cost regular cost
program (%) ADM (A x B) index program (C x D x E)
Educable mentally
retarded 1.30 20,000 260 1.87 $850 $ 413,270
Trainable mentally
retarded 0.24 20,000 48 2.10 850 85,680
Auditorily
handicapped 0.10 20,000 20 2.99 850 50,830
Visually
handicapped 0.05 20,000 10 2.97 850 25,245
Speech
handicapped 3.60 20,000 720 1.18 850 722,160
Physically
handicapped 0.21 20,000 42 3,.64 850 129,948
Special learning
disorder 1.12 20,000 224 2.16 850 411,564
Emotionally
disturbed 2.00 20,000 400 2.83 850 962,200
Homebound
hospital 0.22 20,000 44 1.42 850 53,118
Multiply
handicapped 0.07 20,000 14 2.73 850 32,487
TOTAL 1,782 $2,886,502
Frohreich, supra note 1, at 523.
Address by S. Marland, Commissioner of Education, 31st Annual Convention of the
1974]
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State constitutions generally require that a free public educa-
tion be provided to all children within the state.8 In addition,
forty-nine states have enacted mandatory school attendance
statutes;9 however, the right of an individual citizen to attend
school is not absolute.10 Rather, it is a right qualified by the state's
police power to provide the greatest good for the greatest number.
The practice of excluding handicapped children arises from this
power," and children whose physical or mental handicaps prevent
them from profiting from instruction are often excluded from
public education by statute.' 2 Even a child who is mentally normal
and keeps pace with his peers may be excluded from regular
classes because his presence is thought to be detrimental to the best
interests of the school. 3 Indeed, some states require local school
districts to provide special education classes, but reference to such
classes in the statutes of other states often is so vague as to be
unenforceable.1
4
In light of the recognized importance of education in Ameri-
can society, it is not surprising that the constitutionality of these
exclusionary practices would become a subject of litigation. There
are two avenues of constitutional attack against such practices. One
approach focuses on procedural due process. It requires an inves-
tigation into the procedures for categorizing a child as handicap-
ped and hence excludable from public education.' 5 Another area
National School Boards Ass'n, Philadelphia, Penn., April 5, 1971. For a graphic portrayal of
the uneven responses to the needs of the mentally retarded, see PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON
MENTAL RETARDATION, TOWARD PROGRESS: THE STORY OF A DECADE 18 (1969).
8 Cannon, A Child's Right to a Free Public Education, 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 65 (1971).
I A. STEINHILBER & C. SOKOLOWSKI, STATE LAW ON COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE 11
(1966). These authors cite two states, Mississippi and South Carolina, as not having
compulsory attendance statutes. South Carolina has since enacted such a statute. See S.C.
CODE ANN. § 21-757 (Supp. 1971).
10 L. PETERSON, R. ROSSNILLER & M. VOLZ, THE LAW AND PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATION
333 (1969).
1 Id.
12 A. STEINHILBER & C. SOKOLOWSKI, supra note 9, at 11.
"a Beattie v. Board of Educ., 169 Wis. 231, 172 N.W. 153 (1919). The plaintiff in Beattie
was a 13-year-old child who had been excluded from regular public school classes. He was
slow and .hesitating in speech, had a high, rasping, and disturbing tone of voice accompanied
with uncontrollable facial distortions, and he drooled. He was normal mentally and kept
pace with his fellow students. However, the school board claimed that his physical condition
produced a depressing and nauseating effect upon the teachers and school children. The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin dismissed the child's petition for reinstatement in the absence
of a showing that the action of the school board was illegal or unreasonable.
14 1972 Hearings 3b.
" See Kirp, Schools as Sorters: Constitutional and Policy Implications of Student Classification,
121 U. PA. L. REv. 705 (1973). In Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972),
the court spelled out in detail the rights of a student to procedural due process which must
[Vol. 59:519
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of inquiry involves equal protection considerations. The question,
dealt with in this Note, is whether the equal protection clause
prohibits the exclusion of a child from a publicly supported educa-
tion solely on the basis of physical or mental handicaps.16
1
PROGNOSIS FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED
At the outset, it will be useful to examine the role education
can play for the handicapped, particularly the mentally retarded.17
For educational purposes, a mentally retarded child is one
whose limited capacity prevents him from profiting from an ordi-
nary school curriculum.'8 However, retarded children should not
be considered as a homogenous group since the prognosis for
social and occupational adjustment varies widely depending on the
degree of retardation. Generally speaking, children with intellig-
ence quotients of 55 to 69 are educable.' 9 The incidence of such a
handicap varies from 10 to 50 per 1006 children,20 depending
upon the socioeconomic level of the community. Educable children
constitute 89 percent of all retarded children.21 Although there is
some dispute as to whether these children should be placed in
special classrooms or in regular classrooms with special help,2 2 they
be observed whenever a child is placed in a special education classroom. The issue of the
cultural bias of intelligence quotient tests is a related one. See, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F.
Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
16 The term exclusion is meant to include the situation in which a child is not offered a
curriculum from which he can benefit as well as the situation in which he is not allowed to
attend school. See notes 120-25 and accompanying text infra.
7 Other categories of handicapped children have been excluded from this discussion
for several reasons. The needs of the physically handicapped have, in general, been more
fully met by the states. See 1972 Hearings 61. Moreover, any discussion of their needs is
difficult because they require more detailed categorization with individual consideration
given to each. See, e.g., Rossmiller, Dimensions of Need for Educational Programs for Exceptional
Children, in R. JOHNS, K. ALEXANDER & R. ROSSMILLER, NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL FINANCE
PROJECT, DIMENSION OF EDUCATIONAL NEED 72-85 (1969). Emotionally disturbed children
are not included because of the absence of a generally accepted definition of such children
and because provisions for such children raise an extremely difficult problem regarding the
school's responsibility for the mental health of its pupils. Id. at 82; see notes 120-25 and
accompanying text infra.
18 PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
EDUCATION AND REHABILITATION 33 (1962).
19 Id. at 34.
2 0 Rossmiller, supra note 17, at 74; see note 5 supra.
21 S. KIRK, EDUCATING EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 92 (1st ed. 1962).
22 Rossmiller, supra note 17, at 73.
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have the potential for leaving school to work, to marry, to raise
families, and to make meaningful contributions to society.23
The trainable mentally retarded have intelligence quotients of
25 to 54.24 The incidence of such children is 4 per 1000 children.25
The prognosis for such children is sheltered living in a workshop,
an occupational center, a residential facility, or a home. They have
the potential to learn to take care of themselves in certain routine
activities, to adjust to a home or neighborhood, and to develop
limited economic usefulness in simple and closely supervised work
activities.26
The totally dependent retard is one with an intelligence quo-
tient of 24 or less.2 7 The incidence of such children is 1 per 1000.28
They are unable to survive without close supervision and assistance
in the most routine activities, 29 and retention in an institution is
generally considered appropriate for the dependent retard.30 Al-
though they have some capacity for growth and learning, it is
unclear whether such children can or should be enrolled in regular
public schools. 31 Generally, continued institutionalization will be
necessary for these children no matter what family and community
resources are available to them.32
For the overwhelming majority of mentally retarded children
an appropriate education can be meaningful in preparing them for
lives as self-supporting and productive citizens. Their level of
mental retardation and even their status as mentally retarded may
23 PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 18, at 34. Of 30 mentally
retarded children, 29 are capable of achieving self sufficiency-25 in the ordinary way in the
marketplace, 4 in a sheltered environment. The remaining 1 in 30 is capable, with proper
education and training, of achieving a significant degree of self care. Speech by Thomas K.
Gilhool, National Topical Conference on Career Education for Exceptional Children and
Youth, Feb. 11-14, 1973, in 39 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 597, 603 (1973).
24 PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 18, at 34.
25 Rossmiller, supra note 17, at 74.
26 PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 18, at 34.
27 Id.
28 Rossmiller, supra note 17, at 74.
29 Id. at 72."
30 See NEW YORK DEP'T OF MENTAL HYGIENE, APPROPRIATENESS OF THE CONTINUED
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE STATE SCHOOL POPULATION IN NEW YORK STATE 13 (1969).
3' L. DUNN, EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN IN THE SCHOOLS 151-57 (1963). Professor Dunn
cites studies which suggest that cut-offs should be established at intelligence quotient levels
which would completely exclude the totally dependent retard. However, the court in
Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 296
(E.D. Pa. 1972), was convinced by expert testimony that any retarded child could benefit
from an appropriate education.
2 NEW YORK DEP'T OF MENTAL HYGIENE, supra note 30, at 32.
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change with appropriate treatment and education. 33 The goal of
education of a mentally retarded child is to develop his level of
adaptive behavior to its full potential. Stated in these terms the
mentally retarded child has at least the same personal interest in
education as any other child.
II
A GUARANTEE OF EQUAL ACCESS TO EDUCATION FOR THE
HANDICAPPED UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The standard of review in equal protection cases depends
upon both the nature of the classification involved and the impor-
tance of the interest affected. In most situations, equal protection
requires only that the legislation meet the test of minimum
rationality.34 This requires a showing that (1) the ends sought
constitute a legitimate state purpose and (2) there is a substantial
relationship between the ends sought and the classificatory scheme
employed.35 When a classification is based upon a "suspect" trait or
when fundamental interests are affected, however, the legislation is
subjected to a stricter standard of review, to a more "rigid
scrutiny. '36 In these cases, an overriding social justification must be
established before equal protection requirements are satisfied.3 7 In
other words, the state system involved is no longer entitled to the
usual presumption of validity.38 Instead, the state carries a "heavy
burden of justification" and must show that its system has been
structured with "precision," narrowly tailored to serve legitimate
" Such changes may occur as a result ot increased age, day-to-day variations in
intellectual functioning, and training programs which increase levels of adaptive behavior.
See PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW 12
(1963).
" See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955); Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 344 (1949); Developments in
the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1087 (1969).
'5 The Supreme Court recently reiterated its interpretation of the rational basis test,
observing that "[u]nder 'traditional' equal protection analysis, a legislative classification must
be sustained unless it is 'patently arbitrary' and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate
governmental interest." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
" See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 34, at 356; Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, supra note 34, at 1088.
" See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
192 (1964). Under this test, the burden is on the state to establish that the public interest
involved outweighs the disadvantages imposed on the affected groups.




objectives, and that it has selected the "least drastic means" for
effectuating its objectives. 39
"Suspect" classifications include those based upon race, which
are almost always suspect,40 as well as those based upon wealth,
4'
national origin, 42 alienage, 43 or illegitimacy, 44 which are suspect
only under certain circumstances. 45 A right may be deemed fun-
damental if it is explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.46 Alter-
natively, a right may be fundamental if it is implicitly guaranteed
by virtue of its close nexus with other rights which enjoy explicit
constitutional protection.
47
In attempting to vindicate the rights of handicapped children
excluded from the public school system, a litigant might try to
make out an equal protection claim by showing that the state's
method of pupil placement abridges a fundamental right or is
based upon a suspect classification. This could be accomplished by
establishing any of the following propositions: (1) a minimum
quantum of education is a fundamental right;48 (2) individual
handicaps are a suspect classification when used to exclude chil-
dren from public education; 49 or (3) the exclusion of handicapped
children from public education amounts to discrimination based on
wealth, and wealth is a suspect classification. 50 The state would then
be forced to show that its classificatory scheme was based on a
compelling state interest.
" See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972), and cases cited therein.
40 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
Racial classifications may be used to achieve equality by giving preferential treatment to
groups that have suffered discrimination in the past. When racial classifications are em-
ployed to promote rather than to deny equality, they may be characterized as "benign."
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973).
" See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
42 See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948).
43 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
4 See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
4 San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 61 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
46 See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (free speech); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) ("liberty" protected by due process clause of fourteenth
amendment).
47 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Dunn reviews the Supreme Court's opinions
in voting rights cases and explains that "a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to
participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction." Id. at 336.
The constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal treatment in the voting process can
no longer be doubted even though "the right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly
mentioned." Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
48 See notes 52-75 and accompanying text infra.
41 See notes 76-84 and accompanying text infra.
50 See notes 85-100 and accompanying text infra.
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If the state's system could not be subjected to strict scrutiny,
the plaintiff would have to overcome the state's exclusionary
scheme under the rational basis test, which places a substantial
burden on the plaintiff. It is possible, however, that certain ex-
clusionary schemes might be considered to be "patently arbitrary"
and without any rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
interest.5'
A. The Right to a Minimum Quantum of Education
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of the
right to education for the first time in Rodriguez v. San Antonio
Independent School District.52 In its opinion, the Court distinguished
between the right to an equal education and the right to some
"minimum quantum" of education. While it clearly held that the
right to an equal education is not a fundamental right, the Court
reserved decision on whether some minimum quantum of educa-
tion is fundamental. 53
51 See notes 101-19 and accompanying text infra.
52 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
53 This distinction is not particularly surprising. For example, one of the staunchest
critics of the equal protection cases which led up to the Rodriguez decision was Professor
Philip B. Kurland. See Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional
Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 583 (1968). Nevertheless, Professor Kurland has
subsequently written that:
It is not equality but quality with which we are concerned. For equality can be
secured on a low level no less than a high one. The claim that will have to be
developed will be a claim to adequate and appropriate educational opportunity.
Kurland, The Privilege or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round At Last?", 1972 WASH.
U.L.Q. 405, 419 (emphasis added); see Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public
Education, 71 COLUM. L REv. 1355 (1971). At least four federal courts have agreed that there
is an implied substantive right not to be excluded from a public school education. See Mills v.
Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (requiring public school education for all
handicapped children in District of Columbia); Moore v. Board of Trustees, 344 F. Supp.
682 (D.S.C. 1972) (dictum) (substantive right to education implicit in due process clause);
Cook v. Edwards, 341 F. Supp. 307 (D.N.H. 1972) (indefinite expulsion for appearing
intoxicated at school enjoined on substantive due process grounds); Ordway v. Hargraves,
323 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (D. Mass. 1971) (requiring readmission of pregnant high school
student). Contra Fleming v. Adams, 377 F.2d 975 (10th Cir. 1967).
The argument that some minimum quantum of education is a fundamental right is also
implicitly supported by dictum in Rodriguez and other cases which indicate that discrimina-
tion in education based on wealth is unconstitutional. See notes 85-93 and accompanying text
infra. See also San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 88 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The converse argument that wealth discrimination in the context of exclusion
from education does not invoke strict scrutiny because some minimum quantum of educa-
tion is not a fundamental right is substantially weakened by precedent to the contrary. See
notes 85-93 and accompanying text infra.
In McMillan v. Board of Educ., 430 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1970), indigent parents sued the
Board of Education of the City of New York for failing to provide an appropriate education
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:519
In Rodriguez, the plaintiffs had attacked, as violative of the
equal protection clause, Texas's system of financing public educa-
tion, under which per pupil expenditures varied according to the
wealth of each school district within the state. A three-judge district
court had upheld the plaintiffs' claim, holding in part that equal
education was a fundamental right and that Texas had failed to
demonstrate a compelling state interest for its spending scheme.5 4
In their arguments to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs sought to
establish that equal education was a fundamental right because of
its close nexus to rights explicitly protected by the Constitution.55
The Court conceded that some identifiable quantum of education
might be a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaning-
ful exercise of recognized constitutional rights.5 6 But the Court
said that it could not be inferred from such a concession that a
system providing for relative differences in spending levels for
education within a state was unconstitutional.5 7 In reversing the
decision below, the Court noted that it was sufficient that Texas
had provided "an adequate base education for all children. '58
As the Court recognized in Rodriguez, its holding that a state
for their handicapped children. Under New York law, the Commissioner of Education was
authorized to contract with private schools for the education of handicapped children for
whom there were no adequate public facilities for instruction. The maximum amount
authorized, $2,000, was insufficient to cover full tuition costs at some schools. Therefore,
parents were required to supplement this amount from their own resources. One group of
plaintiffs argued that this violated their right to equal protection, because the benefit of the
grant was arbitrarily denied to them on the ground that they could not pay the additional
tuition. The court held that these allegations raised a substantial constitutional question and
consequently remanded the case to the district judge so that he could convene a three-judge
court. Id. at 1150. The court said that the state could choose not to provide tuition grants,
but having chosen to do so, it became subject to the equal protection clause. Id. at 1149.
In subsequent cases, the Second Circuit has distinguished the facts in McMillan because
the plaintiffs "received nothing ... while others received large sums in cash or equivalent
services." See, e.g., Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 449 F.2d 871, 879 (2d Cir. 1971),
vacated on other grounds, 409 U.S. 75 (1972). It has therefore been made clear that the holding
in McMillan supports the dictum in Rodriguez that wealth discrimination in the context of
exclusion from primary and secondary education triggers strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause. See Moore v. Board of Trustees, 344 F. Supp. 682 (D.S.C. 1972). Higher
education would probably fall within the orbit of social and economic services and as such
would invoke the less rigorous judicial scrutiny of the rational basis test.
5" Rodriguez v. San Antonia Ind. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971),
rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
55 San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). As the Court
noted in Rodriguez, education is not among those rights explicitly protected under the
Constitution. Id. Therefore, the plaintiffs sought to show that it was implicitly protected. See
note 47 and accompanying text supra.
-1 411 U.S. at 36.
57 Id. at 37.
58 Id. at 25 n.60; see id. at 24, 49.
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need not provide equal educational opportunities for all children
within its borders was not meant to foreclose a later finding that at
least a minimum quantum of education must be provided by a state
for all its children.59 Indeed, the argument that there is a funda-
mental right to education because of the close nexus between
education and recognized constitutional rights is far more persua-
sive in the case of total exclusion from education than it was in the
situation presented by Rodriguez. A minimum quantum of educa-
tion should be considered a fundamental right for all children
because of its especially close relationship to one or more recog-
nized constitutional rights such as voting and free speech.60 Addi-
tionally, a minimum education is particularly important for hand-
icapped children because it may be the only avenue by which they
might avoid institutionalization. 6 1 Therefore, it can be cogently
argued that once a state enters into the business of offering
primary and secondary education to its children, it must provide
every child-and especially the handicapped child-with some
minimum quantum of education.
1. The Nexus Between Education and Other Fundamental Rights
There are two recognized constitutional rights which are
threatened whenever any child is excluded from educational op-
portunities. First, illiteracy may be a proper basis for precluding a
citizen's participation in state elections.6 2 Thus, exclusion from
education is a clear threat to the right to vote. Second, education is
essential to the meaningful exercise of first amendment rights. In a
fundamental sense education teaches children communicative
skills. The first amendment guarantee of free speech protects even
uninformed, unpersuasive, and possibly unintelligible speech, but
the meaningful exercise of the right, enabling the speaker to
convince and persuade, is dependent upon his ability to speak
intelligently and knowledgeably.63 However, the argument in favor
59 Id at 36.
60 See notes 62-63 and accompanying text infra.
61 See notes 65-66 and accompanying text infra.
62 Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
" The handicapped person's meaningful exercise of his first amendment rights is
frustrated by his failure to acquire basic communicative skills, and his right to vote might
conceivably be denied because of his illiteracy. Exclusion of the handicapped from education
threatens their enjoyment of these rights, which could not otherwise be denied to them. The
state could not, for example, deny the vote to persons merely because they were physically
handicapped. Conceivably, some of the mentally retarded and emotionally disturbed could
be denied the right to vote (see Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 36
n.79 (1973)) which they generally enjoy at present. See D. MCINTYRE & F. LINDMAN, THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 111, 268 (1961). However, such a denial ought to be by
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of education for the handicapped does not stop there. The ques-
tion of whether or not the handicapped can obtain a free public
education often affects an additional constitutional right-the right
not to be institutionalized which is found in the fifth and four-
teenth amendment concepts of liberty. 4
2. The Right of Handicapped Children Not To Be Institutionalized
Both the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution
protect the individual against the deprivation of his liberty without
due process of law. This protection extends to those who may be
institutionalized because they are insane or mentally retarded. It is
clear that this protection includes both substantive and procedural
guarantees.
In Jackson v. Indiana,65 the Supreme Court considered the
institutionalization of a mentally defective deaf-mute who had been
declared incompetent to stand trial. In holding that the indefinite
commitment of a criminal defendant because of his incompetency
to stand trial violated due process, the Court observed:
The States have traditionally exercised broad power to commit
persons found to be mentally ill. The substantive limitations on
the exercise of this power and the procedures for invoking it
vary drastically among the States.... Considering the number of
persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable that the substantive
constitutional limitations on this power have not been more fre-
quently litigated.
66
The clear import of this opinion is that there are substantive
limitations on the exercise of a state's power to institutionalize
which correspond to the individual's right not to be institu-
tionalized. 67 Such a right is inherent in the concept of liberty as
direct legislation capable of judicial review, and not indirectly by administrative exclusion
from education. As for those rights guaranteed by the first amendment, there is no basis for
distinguishing persons because of their disabilities or handicaps.
6' According to 1960 census information, almost three times as many children are
institutionalized for mental disabilities as for physical disabilities. S. Low, AMERICA'S
CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN INSTITuTIoNs 30 (1965). However, there is a sizeable number of
both categories of handicaps represented in institutions. Id. Of course, there may be children
who would be appropriately institutionalized regardless of the availability of community
resources. NEW YORK DEP'T OF MENTAL HYGIENE, supra note 30, at 32-37. Thus, the
argument may be inapplicable to severely handicapped children. See notes 65-74 and
accompanying text infra. Concern over institutionalization comes at a time when the
incidence of institutionalization, at least of the mentally retarded, has increased steadily.
PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON MENTAL RETARDATION: THE EDGE OF CHANGE, supra note 5, at 4.
65 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
66 Id. at 736-37 (emphasis added).
67 According to its reasoning under the due process clause the Court held that:
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it is used to refer to freedom from bodily restraint.68 The evolving
right to treatment, which has been held to apply to institutionalized
mentally retarded children, 69 is premised upon the right not to be
institutionalized. 70 According to this doctrine, "effective treatment
must be the quid pro quo for society's right to exercise its parens
patriae controls."'
The right not to be institutionalized and the emerging doctrine
of the right to treatment support the proposition that handicapped
children have a right to an appropriate education. Education is
critical to the right of many handicapped children not to be
institutionalized, for the lack of opportunity to obtain an approp-
riate public school education is apt to lead to institutionalization of
the handicapped for two reasons. First, unavailability of an ap-
propriate education in the child's community is frequently used as
a criterion in the decision to institutionalize 72 or to continue
a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on
account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than a reasonable
period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that
he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is
not the case, then the State must either institute the customary civil commitment
proceedings that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or
release the defendant. Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant
probably soon will be able to stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified
by progress toward that goal.
Id. at 738.
68 See Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 396 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
71 Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Inmates of Boys' Training
School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387
(M.D. Aia. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney,
325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). Contra, Burnham v. Department of Pub. Health, 349 F.
Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
71 Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
72 In California, a questionnaire was sent to parents who had placed their children in an
institution or on the waiting list for an institution. When asked what services might have
helped keep their child out of the state hospital, 47% cited special education. ARTHUR
BOLTON ASSOCIATES, A REPORT TO THE ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITTEE ON MENTALLY ILL AND
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN 93 (1970); see GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMM. ON MENTAL RETARDA-
TION, MENTAL RETARDATION-A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR UTAH 44 (1965) (listing
nonavailability of special education as criterion for institutionalization).
The following editorial in a publication supported by the Bureau of Education for the
Handicapped of the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)
points out the type of duress which leads many parents to place their children in institutions:
A small but steady stream of letters continues to flow in from parents whose
children are in institutions for the retarded or mentally ill or who are contemplating
commitment. We would be hard pressed to judge which express the most distress
-those written before the child is placed in the institution or those written after
placement. But it seems safe to say that most decisions to commit to a large
institution are made only because no other choices are available. When parents are
obliged to keep their children at home 24 hours a day, seven days a week because
no education or treatment programs will accept them, they are usually desperate
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institutionalization.13 Second, the prognosis for economic and per-
sonal independence outlined above is predicated upon the child's
receiving appropriate education and training. 74 Finally, if an ap-
propriate education is not provided in a community setting, but is
provided in an institution as part of the emerging right to treat-
ment, parents may be unduly encouraged to institutionalize their
handicapped children, thus perverting the values underlying the
developing right to treatment.
75
for relief from an impossible burden of care. When they "choose" to place their
child in an institution where conditions will work against the child rather than for
him it is only because no other'public alternatives are available and the cost of
-private residential schools or treatment centers is prohibitive.
1 SPECIAL EDUCATION INFORMATION CENTER, CLOSER LOOK NEWSLETTER 1 (1972), quoted in
Blatt, The Legal Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 991, 999 n.23 (1972).
The exceptional child without an education is not merely in jeopardy "of success,"
as the Supreme Court put it, but liberty and life itself. You know very well that the
rate of institutionalization among those children who have been deprived of a
public education is considerably higher. And you know as well that the death rate at
those institutions among children who have not had the opportunity of an educa-
tion which would produce for them those self help skills that enable them, for
example, to avoid scalding hot water, has resulted in a higher rate of death itself.
Speech by Thomas K. Gilhool, supra note 23.
Although California had mandated programs for the educable and trainable
retarded by the early 1960's, it was not providing a day program for a significant
number of more severely and physically handicapped children. Those parents who
did not wish to place their children in private or state-funded residential facilities
were forced to choose between paying for their children's placement in a day
training program sponsored by a parents' association or keeping their children at
home and providing them with 24-hour care. The latter decision was more common
for three reasons: many parents were unable to afford the tuition for the day
training program; many could not find transportation for their children; and some
parents discovered that such programs were nonexistent in their communities.
Therefore, faced with the tremendous burden of total care and training of their
children, many such families eventually applied for state institutional placement.
Koch & Okada, Educational Services for the Mentally Retarded Individual in California, 23
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1075, 1078-79 (1972).
73 See NEW YORK DEP'T OF MENTAL HYGIENE, supra note 30, at 21-22 (indicating
availability of special education as criterion for release from New York State institutions).
74 The National Advisory Committee on Handicapped Children has declared that the
future economic independence of a handicapped child depends on whether he receives
proper training and education. See Rossmiller, supra note 17, at 86.
75 Treatment, including education for those who have been institutionalized, is lauda-
tory and appears to be constitutionally required. Nevertheless, mustering resources for the
handicapped within institutions without concurrently marshalling resources within the
community may achieve the anomalous result of encouraging institutionalization. It has been
argued that federal and state governments already place too much emphasis on placement in
institutions and not enough on residentially based treatment. Kaiser, Developing the Advocacy
Role In Environmental Design, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1119, 1123-24 (1972). Whatever may be
the merits of this argument, it would seem-desirable that judicial intervention not have the
effect of encouraging institutionalization of children who would be better served through
community based programs. The development of a right to an appropriate education would
tend to neutralize the impact of the right to treatment. See note 70 and accompanying text
supra.
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B. Individual Handicaps as the Basis for a Suspect Classfication
Even if a minimum quantum of education is not found to be a
fundamental right for either normal or handicapped children, an
argument can be made that a classification based upon individual
handicaps is suspect when used to exclude a child from education.
Whether the handicapped constitute a suspect class depends on
whether "the class .. . is . ..saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to com-
mand extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process "176
To exclude the handicapped from education is to saddle those
already incapacitated with further disabilities. The handicapped
are often those closest to losing their constitutionally protected
rights through no fault of their own. 77 Exclusion of the handicap-
ped may imperil protected rights which are not even at stake for
the average individual. In the case of education, this includes
liberty in the sense of freedom from institutionalization.
7 8 Of
course, these are only the constitutionally recognized rights which
are affected. In addition, exclusion from education may mean the
loss of the opportunity to attain any degree of economic or per-
sonal self-sufficiency.
79
As a minority, the handicapped suffer under a majoritarian
governmental system. Their disadvantage in the political process is
compounded by two factors. First, most handicaps traditionally
If education is not offered until after institutionalization it may simply be too late. "'We
firmly believe the sooner that mentally retarded children are exposed to a structured
program of education and training, the more likely they will achieve social and financial
sufficiency." Shapp, The Right to an Education for the Retarded in Pennsylvania, 23 SYRACUSE L.
Rav. 1085, 1087 (1972). An appropriate education may be a prerequisite to another
constitutionally recognized right, namely privacy. Both the handicapped child and his
parents suffer an enormous loss of privacy when the child is excluded from appropriate
education and training. A child may suffer the loss of bodily privacy in that he is unable to
acquire self-help skills such as bathing and toilet training except through formal training.
Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Likewise, parents may suffer a loss of privacy in
that they must bear the arduous burden of lifelong care of their handicapped child. Such
obligations severely limit their privacy in the sense that it relates to associational activity.
Moreover, in the case of the parent the obligation to support his handicapped adult child is
state imposed and goes beyond the normal responsibility of parent for child which termi-
nates upon adulthood. The imposition of this prolonged family relationship may come
within the principles enunciated in Bodie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
76 San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
7 Handicaps are comparable to race and lineage in that the individual may be unable to
alter his condition at least in the absence of the assistance of others.
78 See notes 65-75 and accompanying text supra.
7' See note 74 supra.
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have been regarded as a stigma, 80 and parents are often reluctant
to fight for their children's needs in the political arena because of
the attendant publicity and embarrassment involved.8 ' Second, the
handicapped are a fragmentized group lacking political cohesion.
Traditionally, legislative programs for the handicapped have not
fared well unless they could be tagged with a label that had public
appeal. 82 As a result, children whose handicaps cannot be easily
labeled or categorized often slip through the cracks. 83
80 ARTHUR BOLTON AssocIATEs, supra note 72, at 16-17, 50-53.
S8 In a recent speech given to the National Topical Conference on Career Education for
Exceptional Children and Youth, the significance of being handicapped was described as
follows:
It is the experience of being on the wrong end of the judgment made so widely in
our society that we are superior and that they . . . are inferior.
There are other consequences as well. When that judgment is being fed back to
those of us who are on the wrong end of it; we come to believe as the retarded and
their families have come to believe, that indeed we are inferior. We then tend to
feel ashamed, to feel guilty and to be most timid in the face of authority, to be timid
too often in asserting our rights.
Speech by Thomas K. Gilhool, supra note 23. Expert testimony provided in Pennsylvania
Association for Retarded Children indicated that the general public still attaches a stigma to
mental retardation and that according to empirical studies stigmatization is a major concern
among parents of retarded children. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsyl-
vania, 343 F. Sup. 279, 294-95 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Despite attempts by some persons to use mass
media techniques to alter public attitudes about the handicapped, no meaningful change has
resulted. L. LIPPMAN, ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HANDICAPPED 88-91 (1972).
82 ARTHUR BOLTON ASSOCIATES, supra note 72, at 16-17.
83 Id.; see Blatt, Public Policy and the Education of Children With Special Needs, 38 EXCEP-
TIONAL CHILDREN 537, 537 (1972). Another factor which tends to place the retarded at a
disadvantage in the political process is the failure of institutional bodies to represent them
effectively. Several factors have contributed to this failure. First, there is a tendency to
separate the handicapped from society to minimize public awareness of their needs. Second,
the deplorable conditions in some existing facilities tend to focus attention on the quality of
institutional care. Thus, the legislature can provide immediate relief from public pressures
by providing resources for amelioration of these visible deficiencies while other areas of
services go unnoticed and unimproved. Third, emphasis on placement in an institution
tends to be a recurrent theme in the recommendations of federal and state governments and
has resulted in a concentration of resources in residential institutional facilities. Understand-
ably, then, continuing reliance on specialized facilities which concentrate individuals in
isolation from the community has encountered little resistance from those agencies and
citizens groups which society has chosen to be official spokesmen for the needs and desires
of the retarded. Kaiser, supra note 75, at 1122-23.
An example of how governmental emphasis on institutionalization can discourage
agencies and citizens' groups from effectively representing the handicapped has been noted
in New York. Section 4407 of the New York Education Law provides $2,000 per year per
child to educate handicapped children for whom there is no program available in the public
schools. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4407 (McKinney 1970). This law has led some communities to
discontinue their special programs for the handicapped, thus encourging institutionalization
of the handicapped. At the same time, local associations for retarded children benefit from
the law by operating school programs for which they receive $2,000 per child per year. This
income provides the economic stability and the major source of income for associations for
retarded children. The local associations are therefore in the awkward position of facing
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Extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political pro-
cess is particularly appropriate in the setting of public school
education. Exclusion on the basis of handicaps perverts any accept-
able purpose of public education and is actually repugnant to
recognized constitutional values. Deliberate attempts to educate
only nonhandicapped or gifted children are antithetical to our
common understanding of education or human worth.84
C. Exclusion of Handicapped Children From Public Education as Dis-
crimination Based on Wealth
A finding of discrimination based on wealth in primary and
secondary education may invoke strict scrutiny. The law in this
area is in a state of flux since the Supreme Court seems to have
viewed wealth as a suspect classification in some cases but not in
others.85 The Rodriguez opinion does offer some guidance, how-
economic ruin whenever they seek too vigorously the placement of the mentally retarded in
the public schools or advocate the creation of new and expanded programs for them in the
public schools. Blatt, supra at 540.
84 When the state of Nebraska and 21 other states tried to forbid teaching German
immigrants in their mother tongue, the Supreme Court declared that the police power of
the state could not be used to exclude the weakest and most helpless:
[T]he individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The
protection of the Constitution extends to all ....
For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato suggested a law which
should provide: "That the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their
children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child
his parent .... The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the
pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a
separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they
chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as
they should be." In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens,
Sparta assembled the males at seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent
education and training to official guardians. Although such measures have been
deliberately approved by men of great genius, their ideas touching the relation
between individual and State were wholly different from those upon which our
institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any legislature could impose
such restrictions upon the people of a State without doing violence to both the letter
and spirit of the Constitution.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1922).
Insofar as the working of our public school system can be characterized as "chaotic and
unjust," it may be questionable whether the state should be allowed to exclude any child who
does not endanger the right of his fellow students to be educated. San Antonio Ind. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). But the basic presumption
in favor of constitutional validity is even more doubtful as it relates to the exclusion of the
handicapped. Even in states which have not totally neglected the education of the handicap-
ped, programs have been developed for various categories of handicapped persons who can
be tagged with a specific label that has public appeal. As a result, children who cannot be
easily classified or labelled do not receive an appropriate education. Such fragmentized
programs remain unevaluated in terms of societal or individual needs. ARTHUR BOLTON
AssociATrs, supra note 72, at 19-20, 35-36, 57-58.
85 Compare Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), with James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
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ever. Among the arguments advanced by the plaintiffs in that case
was that the Texas system of school financing discriminated against
them on the basis of wealth.8 6 The plaintiffs drew an analogy
between the right to education on the one hand and the right to
appeal a criminal conviction8 7 and the right to vote8 8 on the other.
In the cases pertaining to the latter rights, the Supreme Court had
struck down fees which had precluded their enjoyment by indi-
gents. In so doing, it applied a strict standard of judicial review. In
Rodriguez, the Supreme Court rejected the conclusion that these
precedents could be properly applied under the facts of that case.
At the same time, it suggested that the analogy between education
and criminal appeal or voting would be appropriate in certain
circumstances.
89
The Court found two flaws with the plaintiffs' argument urg-
ing the application of these analogous cases. First, the previous
cases had involved absolute deprivation of the right in question and
the Court felt that an "adequate substitute" was being provided
under the facts of Rodriguez. 90 Second, there was no evidence that
the Texas financing system discriminated against any definable
category of "poor" people because the plaintiffs had failed to
define the injured class with reference to any absolute or functional
level of impecunity.91
It is readily apparent that the exclusion of handicapped chil-
dren from public education constitutes an absolute deprivation.
The second doctrinal hurdle imposed by Rodriguez-the precise
definition of an injured class-is more difficult to overcome. The
Rodriguez court hypothesized a scheme in which the state imposed
tuition requirements for its public schools. This, the court said,
137 (1971). In Valtierra, the Supreme Court considered a California constitutional amend-
ment which discriminated on the basis of wealth by requiring referendum approval of any
low-rent public housing. The Court distinguished the factually similar case of Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), which had involved racial discrimination. One possible
inference from this decision was that, unlike race, wealth was not a suspect classification.
Since all the previous :'wealth discrimination" cases had arguably involved a fundamental
right, it would be possible to conclude that wealth discrimination was an unnecessary
appendage to the holdings in those cases. See, e.g., Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1965) (transcript in order to appeal).
'6 San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-29 (1973).
87 Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458
(1969); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
88 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); McDonald v. Board of Election, Comm'rs, 394
U.S. 802 (1969); Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
89 See notes 90-93 and accompanying text infra.




would result in "a clearly defined class of 'poor' people-definable
in terms of their inability to pay the prescribed sum-who would be
absolutely precluded from receiving an education."9 But absolute
exclusion based on wealth does not occur only when a fee is the
mechanism for that exclusion. Whenever there is a sufficient corre-
lation between family wealth and the incidence of exclusion, the
courts will conclude that the mechanism for exclusion operates to
the peculiar disadvantage of the comparatively poor and is there-
fore unconstitutional.
93
The actual correlation between the incidence of exclusion of
handicapped children from public schools and their families'
wealth is substantial. 94 It is well known that a child's socioeconomic
level affects his chances of bearing a handicap. 95 An economically
deprived child is three to five times as likely to suffer from some of
the more common handicaps. 96 Moreover, it has been noted that
exclusionary practices are endemic to the center cities.97 While
more mobile and affluent families with handicapped children are
'2 An educational finance system might be hypothesized, however, in which the
analogy to the wealth discrimination cases would be considerably closer. If elemen-
tary and secondary education were made available by the State only to those able to
pay a tuition assessed against each pupil, there would be a clearly defined class of
"poor" people-definable in terms of their inability to pay the prescribed sum-who
would be absolutely precluded from receiving an education. That case would
present a far more compelling set of circumstances for judicial assistance than the
case before us today.
Id. at 25 n.60; see McMillan v. Board of Educ., 430 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1970).
93 In addressing the issue of relative discrimination, the Rodriguez Court said that even
if a correlation could be shown between expenditures on education and individual wealth,
[a~ppellee's comparative discrimination theory would still face serious unanswered
questions, including whether a bare positive' correlation or some higher degree of correla-
tion is necessary to provide a basis for concluding that the financing system is
designed to operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the comparatively poor.
San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 26 (1973) (emphasis added). It can
be concluded from this and other statements in Rodriguez that de facto discrimination in the
setting of education is unconstitutional if a sufficiently high correlation can be shown
between those who are discriminated against and individual wealth. Id.; cf. Hawkins v. Town
of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc).
'4 Unfortunately, exact statistical data regarding who is being excluded from public
schools may not be available. In both Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania, school officials
were required to take a census of the number of exceptional children in local school districts.
However, no such census was ever taken and the number of excluded children could only be
made on a best guess basis. See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D.D.C. 1972);
Pennsylvania Ass'n of Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 296
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
9' See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
9 See note 20 and accompanying text supra. See also Remarks of Harrold Russell, supra
note 5.
11 See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON CHILDREN OUT OF SCHOOL, supra note 4, at iii: "[The
problem of exclusion is endemic to most urban school systems in the nation."
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observed to be concentrated in school districts which offer pro-
grams to help their children,98 the immobile, poor, urban families
must remain where exclusion is still practiced. Unfortunately, it is
not yet certain what degree of correlation must be shown to invoke
strict scrutiny. 99 But the possibility exists that the exclusion of
handicapped children amounts to discrimination based on
wealth.100
D. Exclusion of Handicapped Children From Education Under the Ra-
tional Basis Test
Aside from the question of whether exclusion of the hand-
icapped from public schools affects a fundamental interest or is
based upon a suspect classification, such exclusion may be uncon-
stitutional under the rational basis test of the equal protection
clause. In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania,'0 the state association and parents of retarded chil-
dren brought a class action seeking a declaratory judgment that the
statute under which certain retarded children were being excluded
from training and education in the state public schools was uncon-
stitutional. According to the statute, mentally retarded children
could be certified as uneducable and untrainable and, as a result,
be excluded from public schools.' 0 2 In addition, children who had
9' NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL FINANCE PROJECT, FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR SCHOOL FINANC-
ING 24 (1971).
"9 See note 93 supra.
100 In Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), the court held that the
equal protection clause, as incorporated into the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
created a duty upon the school board to provide handicapped children with an appropriate
education. Although the court did not classify Mills as a wealth discrimination case, it
carefully described the plaintiffs as unable to afford alternative private education. Further-
more, the court relied upon Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal
dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1969), for its holding that the denial to poor public school children
of educational opportunities equal to those available to students in more affluent areas of the
city was violative of due process and equal protection. Thus, at least implicitly, Mills stands
for the proposition that the exclusion of handicapped children represents discrimination
based on wealth which compels strict judicial scrutiny. This analysis of Mills is further
supported by the conclusion that the asserted defense, namely limited financial resources,
would probably be a sufficient defense under the rational basis test of the equal protection
clause.
101 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See generally L. LiPPMAN & I. GOLDBERG, THE
RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION-ANATOMY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CASE AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR
EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN (1973).
102 The statutory.formulation was as follows:
The State Board of Education shall establish standards for temporary or permanent
exclusion from the public school of children who are found to be uneducable and
untrainable in the public schools. Any child who is reported by a person who is
certified as a public school psychologist as being uneducable and untrainable in the
public schools, may be reported by the board of school directors to the Superinten-
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not attained a mental age of five could be refused admission to
public schools. 1 3 In effect, this scheme resulted in the permanent
exclusion of children with intelligence quotients below
thirty-five.
1 0 4
During litigation, the parties entered into a final consent
agreement, agreeing that because
[T]he Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has undertaken to pro-
vide a free public education for all of its children between the
ages of six and twenty-one years . . . it is the Commonwealth's
obligation to place each mentally retarded child in a free, public
program of education and training appropriate to the child's capacity. 1
05
In view of these events, the district court did not decide the merits
of the plaintiffs' claims. However, in assuming jurisdiction over the
consent agreement, it held that the plaintiffs' claims were not
"wholly insubstantial and frivolous."' 0 6 In dictum, the court went
beyond this narrow holding to say that the evidence had raised
"serious" doubts as to the existence of a rational basis for such
exclusion. 1 7 The court reached its conclusions by applying the
rational basis test.10 8 In so doing, it seems to have been most
impressed with the evidence that all mentally retarded children
could benefit from a program of education and training and that
the earlier this training was provided, the more thoroughly and
efficiently would the mentally retarded person benefit from it.'0 9
dent of Public Instruction and when approved by him, in accordance with the
standards of the State Board of Education, shall be certified to the Department of
Public Welfare as a child who is uneducable and untrainable in the public schools.
When a child is thus certified, the public schools shall be relieved of the obligation
of providing education or training for such child.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1375 (Supp. 1973-74).
103 Id. § 13-1304. The relevant provision stated: "Admission of beginners . . . . The
board of school directors may refuse to accept or retain beginners who have not attained a
mental age of five years .... "
1,4 In certain instances this statute results in permanent exclusion since it is theo-
retically possible for a child with an I.Q. of 35 or below (the I.Q. intelligence
test is normally relied upon to establish a mental age) never to achieve a mental
age of five years. This result occurs because the I.Q. ratio levels off at chrono-
logical age 15.
Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 282 n.4 (E.D.
Pa. 1972).
105 Id. at 285 (emphasis in original). This decision seems to have been politically
popular. See Shapp, supra note 75, at 1085.
106 Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 293
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
107 Id. at 297.
108 Id. at 283 n.8.
10-. The court summarized the evidence as follows:
[A]ll mentally retarded persons are capable of benefitting from a program of
education and training; that the greatest number of retarded persons, given such
education and training, are capable of achieving self-sufficiency and the remaining
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Assuming these findings of fact are correct, the Pennsylvania
statutes, or any similar statutes, may lack a reasonable basis in fact
and may therefore be unconstitutional under the rational basis
test."10 A more troublesome issue arises when the state asserts that
it has chosen to limit its curriculum offering in order to preserve its
fiscal resources. Although "preservation of the fisc" does not nor-
mally constitute a compelling state interest,"' courts have held it to
be a legitimate state interest under the traditional equal protection
analysis.
12
There are two possible tacks which the state might take to try
to demonstrate that exclusion of the handicapped from the normal
public school is a rational way of preserving its fiscal resources. The
few, with such education and training are capable of achieving some degree of
self-care; that the earlier such education and training begins, the more thoroughly
and the more efficiently a mentally retarded person will benefit from it and,
whether begun early or not, that a mentally retarded person can benefit at any
point in his life and development from a program of education.
Id. at 296 (footnotes omitted).
110 One author has concluded, however, that
[t]here is little evidence that special day classes, as presently constituted, which
emphasize the development of self-care and socialization by informal group instruc-
tion are effective for homogeneous groups of trainable children with IQ's over the
full range from 25-50.
L. DUNN, supra note 31, at 155.
lii Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Some qualification to this general rule
might be required under exceptional circumstances where, for example, economies of scale
are lost due to low population density and topography. See, e.g., T. MAYEDA, DELIVERY OF
SERVICES TO MENTALLY RETARDED CHILDREN AND ADULTS IN FIVE STATES 76 (1971) (Col-
orado). In such situations, the state would still be obliged to develop the least drastic
approach to this problem.
1'2 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
Educating handicapped children has always been considered by the public educa-
tional system to be a "frill" to take care of after every other school need. The
reasons used for the denial of educational services to handicapped children are
many. They include such statements as the handicapped cannot learn, their pres-
ence in school will negatively affect the learning of normal children, these children
make nonhandicapped children and adults uncomfortable, the cost of their educa-
tion is too great, and the teachers and facilities are in short supply. Most of these
reasons are mere "wives tales." Those relating to the additional resources necessary
are reality.
Weintraub & Abeson, Appropriate Education for All Handicapped Children: A Growing Issue, 23
SYRACUSE L. Rev. 1037, 1057-58 (1972). Another author has noted that the higher cost of
educating the exceptional child is the reason most often given for unequal access to
educational opportunity. Thomas, Finance: Without Which There Is no Special Education, 39
EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 475, 475 (1973).
Not only the cost but the efficacy of special education may be an issue:
The dearth of reliable data on the cost of exceptional child programs is surpassed
by the lack of conclusive research with regard to the efficacy of special educa-
tion programs .... The complete picture on the efficacy of educational programs
may be an enigma that will always plague educators due to the uniqueness of
programs and people, who by nature may be too diverse and unprogrammable
to respond in the same way to the same treatment and teaching techniques.
Frohreich, supra note 1, at 524.
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first is to argue that in light of their limited productivity, education
of the handicapped is not a good investment. 113 In response to this,
proponents of education for the handicapped reply that failure to
educate not only leads to lost productivity but also to increased
institutionalization costs. Measured in these terms, education of the
handicapped must be regarded as a good investment."1
4
The second approach for the state is to argue that the task of
reconciling the needs of its citizens with the finite resources availa-
ble requires it to select the most pressing from among many
important social goals. The state would urge that this should not be
a judicial decision, and many courts have been reluctant to disturb
the choice which a state has made between competing needs for
public funds."l 5 In Lau v. Nichols,"16 for example, the Ninth Circuit
held that the state could refuse to teach Chinese students in their
native tongue so long as it provided them with the same basic
curriculum which it offered to all other students. 17 The court
113 L. DUNN, supra note 31, at 158-59.
H4 Rossmiller, supra note 17, at 86. According to the President's Committee on Mental
Retardation, institutional care for the retarded costs approximately $40,000 per bed in
construction costs, and the yearly costs for maintenance of the retarded range from $2,000
to $10,000. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THESE Too MUST BE EQUAL:
AMERICA'S NEEDS IN HABILITATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 14 (1969).
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare states that the cost of assistance to a
handicapped child either in the form of institutionalization or welfare is $250,000. Wall St.
J., March 22, 1972, at 22, col. I (eastern ed.).
115 Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970).
£16 483 F.2d 791, rehearing en bane denied, 483 F.2d 805 (9th Cir.. 1973).
"7 Id. at 798-99. On request of a member of the court who was not a member of the
Lau panel, an unsuccessful attempt was made to have the Ninth Circuit consider the case en
banc. There was a dissenting opinion filed as well as a concurring opinion. In the dissenting
opinion, Judge Hufstedler wrote:
The Chinese children have met prima facie even the rigorous standards of San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez . ..:
(1) They are a member of a class precisely identifiable, (2) the state has participated
in discriminating against them, (3) the children who speak no English and are
taught none are absolutely deprived of education and it has not been shown that
those who are taught some English have a meaningful access to an adequate
education. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez is the most recent
pronouncement in a lengthy chain of equal protection cases. But even if it stood
alone, San Antonio Independent School District would compel reversal.
Id. at 808. Concurring with the decision to reject the request for an en banc hearing, Judge
Trask, who wrote the majority opinion in Lau, attempted to square that opinion with
Rodriguez. He argued along the following lines:
A basic misapprehension of the factual situation seems to color, if not pervade, the
dissent from the court's refusal to grant en banc consideration. This appears from
the statement that "the majority opinion concedes that the children who speak no
English receive no education ...... The stipulation upon which the case was
submitted for decision ... refers to 2,856 Chinese-speaking students in the school
district "who need special instruction in English." It continues by dividing those
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reasoned that the determination of what forms of remedial educa-
tion to provide was a "complex decision, calling for significant
amounts of executive and legislative experience and non-judicial
value judgments."'" 8 This argument represents a significant hurdle
for a litigant challenging the exclusion of handicapped children
from public education under the rational basis test."9
students into one group who receive designated amounts of special help in English
and those who do not.
• ..Those who do not, however, are not assumed "to receive no education."
Although some do not receive special help, there is no indication that they are not
exposed to whatever English courses are afforded. The majority opinion does not
equate the need for "special help" in English with receiving no education.
•.. As the Court recognized in Rodriguez the Equal Protection Clause does not,
where wealth is involved, "require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages."
Id. at 808 (emphasis in original). Thus, even the concurring opinion does not dispute the
proposition that according to Rodriguez the state may not exclude a child from the public
schools so that he receives "no education." Rather the dispute appears to be over what
constitutes exclusion. See notes 120-25 and accompanying text infra.
" Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791, rehearing en banc denied, 483 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1973)
(emphasis added). For an explanation of the theoretical underpinning of this doctrine, see
Schoettle, supra note 53, at 1389-93.
" 9 But see Schwartz, The Education of Handicapped Children: Emerging Legal Doctrines, 7
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 125, 126-27 (1973). Mr. Schwartz concludes that exclusion of the
handicapped is unconstitutional under the rational basis test. He bases his conclusion on two
precedents: Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279
(E.D. Pa. 1972), and MilTs v. Bohrd of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). According to
the argument he advances, these cases, taken together, reject the only state interests that can
be offered to justify the exclusion: (1) the factual assertion that retarded children are not
educable and (2) the legal defense of a lack of sufficient government resources. Schwartz,
supra, at 127. Unfortunately, the opinion in Mills is very cryptic, and there is room for
confusion as to what standard was applied. However, it is probably incorrect to conclude that
the court was applying the r~tional basis test. The cases which it cited in reaching its
decisions were Brown v. Board 6f Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954), and Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.
Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1969). Insofar as these are cases in
which a suspect classification was found, it appears that the Mills court was applying the rigid
scrutiny test. Thus, advocates representing handicapped children must face the likelihood
that unless rigid scrutiny is applied, the defense of lack of governmental resources may be
upheld.
Another case which constitutes a hurdle for handicapped children is McMillan v. Board
of Educ., 430 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1970). In that case, the Second Circuit remarked:
We begin by agreeing with the district court that a state does not deny equal
protection merely by making the same grant to persons of varying economic need..
..We add that if New York had determined to limit its financing of educational
activities at the elementary level to maintaining public schools and to make no
grants to further the education of children whose handicaps prevented them from
participating in classes there, we would perceive no substantial basis for a claim of
denial of equal protection.
Id. at 1149; see Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 449 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1971), vacated
on other grounds, 409 U.S. 75 (1972). In McMillan, the court distinguished the case in which
some handicapped children were being provided an appropriate education, but others
similarly situated were not. The court held that in such a situation there was a substantial
claim under the equal protection clause. McMillan v. Board of Educ., supra, at 1150.
Upon remand, the court below disposed of the case on other grounds. McMillan v.
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III
THE SCOPE OF THE STATE'S RESPONSIBILITY
To EDUCATE
Having once determined that the handicapped enjoy a right to
public education, there is a need to define the scope of the
education which the state must provide. What, for example, is the
responsibility of an educational system towards the mental health
of its students? It has been held by the courts of Illinois that
institutional care does not fall within the system of public schools
guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution. 2 0 On the other hand, it is
clear that the concept of public education is one which has evolved
to include a broad range of curriculum offerings and services.1"'
Certainly, not everything which would be helpful to a physically or
mentally handicapped child falls under the rubric of education.
22
Board of Educ., 331 F. Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Therefore, the issue of whether the state
could develop sufficient reason for its actions was not explored. It appears, however, that
when a particular category of handicapped children is not receiving an education while
others similarly handicapped are, judicial intervention under the rational basis test may be
appropriate. Also, it is clear, regardless of equal protection considerations, that due process
requires that there be a fair and orderly procedure based on ascertainable standards for
selecting children for a limited number of spaces and that selection from among children
equally qualified be made in some reasonable manner. Holmes v. New York City Housing
Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
120 Department of Pub. Welfare v. Haas, 15 Ill. 2d 204, 213-14, 154 N.E.2d 265, 270-71
(1958).
121 School student services can now include such diverse functions as programs for
emergency, preventive, and medical care, health, guidance, psychologists, psychiatrists, social
work, municipal recreational, remedial, retarded therapy, and adjustive special services for
physically handicapped, mentally retarded, and emotionally disturbed, referrals to commun-
ity agencies, assistance for migrants and transients, incentives for youths to remain in school,
student-to-student encouragement, and special counseling for students eligible to leave
school after graduation. See generally G. COLLINS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BASES
FOR STATE ACTION IN EDUCATION 1900-1968 (1968).
122 Some educators have maintained that the trainable mentally retarded ought not to
be the responsibility of the public schools:
They have based their position on the following arguments. . . .. The unique
function of the schools is to educate children who can learn academically and the
trainable mentally retarded can neither acquire appreciable skills in the three R's
nor can they do abstract reasoning, make abstract judgments, or solve adult
problems... [Tihe prime argument has centered around educability versus trainabil-
ity. Most authorities averse to these special day classes have hinged their argument
on the position that the school's responsibility, as a social institution, is to educate
children first of all in the tool subjects and then in the conventional academic
subjects. Thus, trainable children should be excluded since they cannot hope to
accomplish these goals.
L. DUNN, supra note 31, at 157-58 (emphasis in original). It has been argued that such a
position confuses the responsibility of the teachers as a professional group with the
responsibility of the public schools as a social institution. Assuming that there is a responsibil-
ity on the part of society to instruct the trainable mentally retarded in basic skills, it is
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The responsibility of educators to handicapped children would be
best decided as a question of fact based on what are customary
educational practices. In light of the widespread development of
special education, there exists a substantial body of expert opinion
upon which the courts can rely in determining the scope of the
duty to educate.
In providing a minimum quantum of education for excep-
tional children, the state is not limited to any standardized educa-
tional offering, but has the discretion to provide an alternate
curriculum which is appropriate to the needs of the handicapped
child.123 Nevertheless judicial supervision might be required in two
instances. First, in the case of the most extreme degree of hand-
icaps, the court might be called upon to determine whether there
was a recognized educational technique which was appropriate in
light of the child's handicaps. Only in the absence of a recognized
educational technique would the state be absolved of its duty to
educate.' 24 Second, the courts would have to decide in what in-
stances a child was being effectively excluded by a curriculum
which was inappropriate to his needs. Effective exclusion would be
actionable only when the child's unmet needs fell within the scope
of the responsibility to educate.
25
recognized that the public school system, as a social institution, is the most appropriate social
agency to provide such skills. Id. at 159.
123 Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971). In that case the state was not required
to provide a transcript because the plaintiff had an "adequate substitute."
124 It should be noted that the modem concept of special education is a pervasive one.
For example, it has been suggested that "[olne of the general aims of special education is
first to ameliorate the deficit by medicine, training, or whatever means are feasible, and then
to compensate for the residual deficit by strengthening other abilities and providing specially
adapted materials." S. KIR.K, supra note 1, at 36.
125 Once it is determined that a child's needs are within the scope of the responsibility to
educate, a court must apply some standard of adequacy to the education which he is
receiving. A standard which has been formulated in the related field of the right to
treatment is that the state is bound to make "a bona fide effort' to cure or improve.
Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791, rehearing en banc denied, 483 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1973),
provides a fact pattern which presents the issue of effective exclusion by the limited
curriculum which a child is offered. As noted in the dissenting opinion, it was argued that
for the plaintiff children education had become "mere physical presence as audience to a
strange play which they [did] not understand." Id. at 801. Concurring in the decision to
reject en banc consideration, Judge Trask argued that characterization of the case as one of
exclusion was inappropriate. According to the stipulations upon which the case was submit-
ted for decision, the plaintiffs were children who needed special instruction "but it could not
be assumed from this that hey were receiving 'no education.' " Id. at 808. Thus, the issue
may have been avoided by virtue of the fact that the stipulations by the parties failed to
anticipate the applicable rule of law.
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CONCLUSION
Rodriguez was the first case -in which the Supreme Court faced
the issue of a substantive right to an education. That case has been
described as a setback for reformers, and so it may be. It was a case
of tremendous practical difficulty, which threatened to immerse the
federal courts in complex administrative problems. Nevertheless,
the Court's opinion suggested two theories under which it is
possible to conclude that the exclusion of the handicapped from
education is unconstitutional. First, the Court suggested that the
Constitution guarantees some minimum quantum of education for
every child. Second, it apparently accepted the analogy between
exclusion from education and exclusion from other fundamental
activities such as voting and criminal appeal. Proceeding from this
analogy, exclusion from education because a child cannot afford to
pay a fee is clearly unconstitutional. So also is a pattern of exclusion
in which there is a sufficient correlation between those who are
excluded from education and those who are poor.
In addition to these two theories, it is possible that a child's
handicap is a "suspect" trait when used to exclude him from public
school. Both because of their stake in acquiring the skills necessary
for independence, and their political ineffectiveness, the handicap-
ped warrant protection from the majoritarian political process.
Public school education is a particularly appropriate setting in
which to consider a child's handicaps as a "suspect" basis for
exclusion. Exclusion of the weakest and most helpless is repugnant
to any acceptable purpose of our system of public education.
Finally, exclusionary practices will fail even to pass the rational
basis test when they are based upon patently arbitrary statutes.
Robert L. Flanagan
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